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Dutch Treaty Policy Regarding Latin American
Countries
by Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama
This article examines the international tax treatypolicy of the Netherlands regarding income tax
treaty negotiations, including the relevant parts of the
Memorandum Tax Treaty Policy 2011 (2011 TTP)
published by the minister of finance in the Nether-
lands. It further analyzes the treaties concluded be-
tween the Netherlands and Latin American countries,
mainly with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and
Venezuela.
I. Introduction
In order to enhance international tax cooperation
and tax competition, developing and developed coun-
tries are searching for bilateral instruments to exchange
information, to promote transparency, and to enhance
and protect foreign direct investments. Also, the in-
creased interest of governments to challenge capital
flows from developing and developed countries to tax
havens and offshore financial centers1 resulted in politi-
cal leaders addressing the following in G-8 and G-20
meetings2:
• the importance for developing countries to en-
hance international tax cooperation, including
exchange of information among tax administra-
tions and other law enforcement agencies, to
counter illicit activities; and
• their willingness to assist developing countries to
strengthen their tax systems with the goal of in-
creasing their own tax revenue resources.3
1For the OECD:
offshore financial centers, broadly defined, reduce revenue
available to developing countries where they act as a desti-
nation for income streams and wealth protected by a lack
of transparency and show a refusal or inability to ex-
change information with revenue authorities who may
have taxing rights in respect of that income or those as-
sets. Data on revenues lost by developing countries from
offshore non compliance is unreliable. Most estimates,
however, exceed by some distance the level of aid received
by developing countries — around USD 100 billion annu-
ally.
OECD, ‘‘Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Informa-
tion for Tax Purposes: A Background Information Brief,’’ May
10, 2010, at 6.
2For instance, in the G-20 summits in Washington, London,
and Pittsburgh, and in the G-8 summits in L’Aquila and Lecce
(Italy) and Hokkaido (Japan), among others, political leaders ex-
pressed their commitment to tackle tax evasion and their willing-
ness to take actions against noncooperative jurisdictions includ-
ing tax havens, and against those countries that do not meet
OECD international standards for transparency and exchange of
information.
3See Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, ‘‘EU and OECD
Proposals for International Tax Cooperation: A New Road?’’
Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 23, 2010, p. 609.
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Despite those common objectives, the instruments
used by countries vary in accordance to the tax or in-
vestment policy of each country and sometimes to the
status of some countries as developing countries, off-
shore financial centers, and tax havens. Those instru-
ments consist of the following:
• bilateral investment treaties;
• income tax treaties following the OECD model;
• income tax treaties following the U.N. model;
• bilateral and multilateral tax information exchange
agreements following the OECD Model Agree-
ment on Exchange of Information on Tax Mat-
ters; and
• the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Adminis-
trative Assistance in Tax Matters jointly developed
by the Council of Europe and the OECD.4
The objective of this article is to analyze and ad-
dress:
• the international tax treaty policy of the Nether-
lands applied to treaties concluded between the
Netherlands and Latin American countries; and
• the relevant parts of the Netherlands’ 2011 TTP.5
Section II describes the main objectives of the
Netherlands’ policy outlined in the 2011 TTP. Section
III examines the most relevant provisions in the treaties
concluded by the Netherlands. The relevant provisions
addressed in this article concern residence, permanent
establishment, dividends, interest, royalties, capital
gains, most favored nation clauses, antiabuse clauses,
interpretation, and arbitration. Finally, in Section IV,
some recommendations are provided regarding the in-
ternational tax treaty policy of the Netherlands.
II. Background
A. Treaty Network
The Netherlands has an extensive network of bilat-
eral tax treaties. Based on the most recent treaty over-
view (April 2013) as published by the Dutch Ministry
of Finance,6 the Netherlands has concluded 97 treaties.
Within Latin America, the Netherlands has concluded
treaties with Argentina (1998), Brazil (1991), Mexico
(1994 and 2009 protocol), Panama (2011), and Ven-
ezuela (1997), and it is negotiating with Colombia (ad-
vanced negotiations) and Chile.
Also, the Netherlands has concluded 29 TIEAs,
mainly with tax havens and offshore financial centers
(for example, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin
Islands, and Bermuda). With Latin American coun-
tries, the Netherlands has concluded a TIEA with
Costa Rica (in force) and Uruguay (not yet in force).7
Further, the Netherlands is a signatory to the OECD-
Council of Europe Multilateral Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.
B. The 2011 TTP
On February 11, 2011, the Netherlands published
the 2011 TTP, which among other things addressed the
goal to enhance international tax cooperation by
strengthening ‘‘domestic resource mobilization’’ and by
means of enhancing transparency and exchange of in-
formation in tax matters.
The first objective results in the Netherlands’ will-
ingness to assist in the strengthening of tax administra-
tions of developing countries and to cooperate with the
work of the OECD Informal Task Force on Tax and
Development. The second objective regards the Nether-
lands’ goal to expand its tax treaty network to an in-
creased number of developing countries. The third ob-
jective results in the Netherlands concluding treaties
with developing countries containing provisions (that
is, article 26 of the OECD model) regarding the ex-
change of information (on request, automatic, and
spontaneous) as well as by concluding TIEAs.
The Netherlands also states in the 2011 TTP that
the use of the Dutch standard treaty model is no
longer necessary because the Netherlands predomi-
nantly concludes its treaties in accordance with the
OECD model.8
Within the above context, the following paragraphs
will deal with the international tax treaty policy of the
Netherlands regarding issues that are of relevance
when concluding treaties with Latin American coun-
tries.
III. Dutch Tax Treaty Policy
A. Residency
When concluding treaties, the Netherlands follows
the OECD model, stating that the treaty applies to resi-
dents of one of the contracting states regardless of
their nationality (article 1 of the OECD model). The
Netherlands also includes in the definition of resident
the requirement that the person must be liable to tax in
one of the contracting states (article 4(1) of the OECD
model).
Further, under the 2011 TTP, the Netherlands at-
tempts to consider entities that in principle are not
4This convention provides a multilateral basis for a wide vari-
ety of administrative assistance, including information exchange
on request, automatic exchange of information, and simulta-
neous tax examinations; available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
exchangeofinformation/
conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters.htm.
5The 2011 TTP was adopted by the Dutch parliament in mid-
2012.
6See http://www.government.nl/ministries/fin. See also
http://www.eoi-tax.org/jurisdictions/NL#agreements.
7Id.
8Preface 2011 TTP (Voorwoord Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid
2011), at 9-10.
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liable to tax to qualify as residents for tax treaty pur-
poses (exempt entities). This approach follows the
OECD commentary to article 4(1) of the OECD
model (paragraphs 8.5 and 8.6). As a consequence,
under the 2011 TTP, the following entities can be re-
garded as residents even though they are not liable to
tax: pension funds, nonprofit organizations, associa-
tions and foundations (without entrepreneurial activi-
ties), and exempt investment institutions (vrijgestelde
beleggingsinstelling).
Based on the above, when negotiating treaties, the
Netherlands has a goal of regarding entities liable to
tax — if those entities are governed by Dutch law or if
their place of central management is in the Nether-
lands (and further, those entities are considered tax
transparent) — to be (deemed) Dutch residents for tax
purposes.9 Nevertheless, in accordance with the afore-
mentioned main objective, when negotiating a treaty,
the Netherlands is willing to agree on an exclusion of
tax-exempt entities from treaty benefits.
For illustration purposes, in the 2009 protocol
amending the Mexico-Netherlands treaty and its 1993
protocol,10 a new article was introduced stating that
the treaty is inapplicable to corporations and other le-
gal persons that are totally or partially exempted from
taxes by a special regime or by administrative practice
of one of the countries. For this purpose, the special
regime should be decided by means of mutual agree-
ment of the tax authorities of both countries.11
A less far-reaching provision has been included in
the protocol to the Netherlands-Panama treaty con-
cluded in 2011. This protocol states that the competent
authorities will decide by means of mutual agreement
to what extent a resident of one of the contracting
states that is subject to a special regime will not be en-
titled to the benefits of the treaty.12 This position pro-
vides for a mutual agreement procedure to decide
which residents subject to a special regime should be
included in the treaty instead of first providing a nega-
tive list, as is the case for the treaty with Mexico. It
could reasonably be expected that this provision will
also be used in future treaties concluded by the Nether-
lands.
Further, the Netherlands follows the tiebreaker rule
of the OECD model to determine residence in case of
dual residency of qualifying persons. For individuals,
residence is determined by the following criteria: per-
manent home, habitual abode, nationality, or by means
of mutual agreement (article 4.2). Those criteria are to
be applied in hierarchical order. For corporations and
other legal persons, the decisive criterion is the place of
effective management (article 4.3).
More specifically, the 2009 protocol amending the
Mexico-Netherlands treaty states that if the corpora-
tion or legal person has a dual residence, residence will
be determined by means of mutual agreement between
the tax authorities of both countries, taking into ac-
count the place of effective management, place of in-
corporation, or any other relevant criteria.13 However,
if no agreement can be reached, then the tax treaty
benefits will be inapplicable to this corporation or legal
person. There is, nevertheless, a possibility of obtaining
the treaty benefits by means of the application of the
Mexico-Netherlands treaty articles regarding nondis-
crimination (article 23) or mutual agreement (article
24).
B. Permanent Establishment
The Netherlands follows the definition of PE ac-
cording to article 5(1) and article 5(2) of the OECD
model. The definition does not include activities of a
preparatory and auxiliary character, which is in accord-
ance with article 5(4) of the OECD model.
Further, in the 2011 TTP, the Netherlands states
that it does not prefer an expansion of the PE concept
but that expansion could nevertheless be accepted by
the Netherlands if it is part of the tax treaty policy of
the other country.14
The first issue in which the Netherlands may deviate
from the OECD model definition and approach of PE
is regarding article 5(3) of the OECD model. The
Netherlands in the 2011 TTP recognizes differences in
the approach toward PE both from the U.N. and from
the OECD regarding a building site, a construction
assembly or installation project, or related supervisory
activities that are being carried out in the source coun-
try. For the U.N. model, those activities are considered
a PE if performed for a period longer than six months
(article 5(3)a of the U.N. model), whereas in the
OECD model (article 5(3)) that period is 12 months.
The Netherlands states that for developing countries,
in principle it is willing to follow the approach of the
U.N. model (that is, six months) if that criterion has
9Following the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of
Dec. 4, 2009 (HR nr.08/05071, V-N 2009/63.17). In this judg-
ment, the Dutch Supreme Court stated that only the tax-exempt
entities that are explicitly mentioned as residents for tax treaty
purposes in the treaty are the ones that meet the liability to tax
criterion of article 4 of the OECD model. Conversely, the tax-
exempt entities not mentioned in the underlying treaty are there-
fore disregarded as resident for tax purposes.
10This 2009 protocol amending the Mexico-Netherlands
treaty was signed on December 11, 2008, and it is in force as of
December 31, 2009. This 2009 protocol replaces the 1993 proto-
col.
11Article 9 of the 2009 protocol to the Mexico-Netherlands
treaty.
12Ad 1 protocol modifying article 1 of the Netherlands-
Panama treaty.
13Ad 3 protocol replacing article 4(3) of the Mexico-
Netherlands treaty.
142011 TTP (Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid 2011), at 40.
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been established as part of the international treaty
policy of the developing country. However, this ap-
proach may be changed if the total outcome of the
treaty negotiations is unacceptable for the Netherlands.
The decisive criteria regarding what is acceptable in
this respect are not further explained in the 2011 TTP.
Therefore, the Netherlands always will unilaterally de-
cide what is acceptable and for which developing coun-
tries the period of six months will be followed.
The 2011 TTP states that in order to accept the six
months, the Netherlands may require additional condi-
tions regarding the calculation of the attribution of
profits to PEs.15 It is unclear from the text of the 2011
TTP what additional conditions must be fulfilled. Also,
Dutch treaties concluded previously that contain a six-
month period have not introduced any additional con-
ditions. Generally, the Netherlands has accepted this
term of six months in its treaties with Latin American
countries (for example, in the treaties with Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Panama, although with another
criterion (which is that the activities should be per-
formed for more than 183 days in a 12-month period)).
However, in the treaty with Venezuela, a 12-month
period has been included.
The second issue in which the Netherlands may de-
viate from the definition and approach of PE in the
OECD model is regarding article 5(6) of the OECD
model. In principle, the Netherlands follows the intro-
duction of independent personal services in the con-
cept of PE. For instance, in the treaty with Panama,
independent personal services are included in the PE
article (article 5(7)). However, in the treaty with
Mexico,16 the Netherlands has deviated from the
OECD model and has accepted the use of article 14 of
the U.N. model for independent personal services. The
objective of article 14 of the U.N. model is to remove
the limitation imposed on the source state to only tax
income from independent personal services if the in-
come is derived from a fixed base.
C. Dividends
Regarding substantial participations (5 percent or
more for Dutch standards) the Netherlands’ goal is for
exclusive taxation in the country of residence of the
recipient of the dividends. The main reason for this
approach is the application of capital import neutrality
to active foreign investments. The Netherlands applies
the participation exemption under which dividends re-
ceived from qualifying shareholdings (that is, in general
shareholdings of at least 5 percent not held as portfolio
investments) are exempt at the level of the corporate
shareholder. If the source country levies a dividend
(withholding) tax, this will result in an additional tax
burden for the recipient of the dividends since any for-
eign withholding tax cannot be credited against Dutch
corporate income tax. Therefore, in order to improve
the competitive position of Dutch resident companies,
the Netherlands hopes to reduce those withholding
taxes as much as possible under tax treaties.
The Netherlands follows this approach regardless of:
• the source country being a developing or a devel-
oped country; or
• the withholding tax percentages for substantial
participations in the OECD model or the U.N.
model.
Unlike the discussion above on PEs, the Nether-
lands does not address in its tax treaty policy the differ-
ences between the U.N. and the OECD models.
However, with Latin American countries, dividend
withholding tax has been agreed as follows:
• with Argentina: 10 percent if substantial sharehold-
ing (more than 25 percent) and 15 percent for
portfolio investments;
• with Brazil: 15 percent for all investments;
• with Mexico: 5 percent if substantial shareholding
(more than 10 percent) and 15 percent for portfo-
lio investments;
• with Panama: 0 percent if substantial shareholding
(more than 15 percent) and 15 percent for portfo-
lio investments; and
• with Venezuela: 0 percent if substantial sharehold-
ing (more than 25 percent) and 10 percent for
portfolio investments.
The following paragraphs address the international
tax treaty policy in the Netherlands regarding interest
and royalties.
D. Interest and Royalties
Similar to dividends, the Netherlands seeks in its
treaties to agree on exclusive taxation of interest and
royalties by the country of residence. No reference to
the approach of the U.N. model has been made in the
2011 TTP.17
However, the approach in the treaties concluded by
the Netherlands with Latin American countries may
vary regarding the percentages of the interest and roy-
alty withholding tax depending on the type of interest
or royalty income. Those percentages are provided be-
low:
• with Argentina: interest 12 percent and royalty 3
percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent (de-
pending on the type of royalty);
15Id.
16This approach was left unchanged despite the introduction
of the 2009 protocol.
17The U.N. approach is in favor of source taxation on interest
and royalties. The OECD model provides for source taxation
only on interest and exclusive residence taxation on royalties.
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• with Brazil: interest 10 percent (loans more than 7
years) and 15 percent in other cases, and royalty
25 percent and 15 percent;
• with Mexico: interest 5 percent and 10 percent, and
royalty 10 percent;
• with Panama: interest 5 percent and royalty 5 per-
cent; and
• with Venezuela: interest 5 percent and royalty 5 per-
cent, 7 percent, and 10 percent.
1. Interest
The Netherlands has negotiated in its treaties with
Latin American countries reduced rates and exemp-
tions that differ among treaties. For interest income,
the treaty with Argentina introduces a 12 percent with-
holding tax at source with specific exemptions; the
treaty with Brazil introduces a 10 percent or a 15 per-
cent rate and specific exemptions; the treaty with
Mexico and the 2009 protocol introduce a 5 percent or
10 percent rate18; and the treaties with Panama and
with Venezuela introduce a 5 percent rate with specific
exemptions.
For illustration purposes, the reduced rate of 5 per-
cent (treaty with Mexico and 2009 protocol) or an ex-
emption (treaties with Brazil, Argentina, Panama, and
Venezuela) applies to interest paid to a bank of a con-
tracting state, any of its political subdivision or local
entities, and the interest paid to other entities or bodies
(including financial institutions) as a result of financing
provided by those institutions. The treaty with Panama
also exempts the interest paid regarding the sale on
credit of merchandise or equipment to an enterprise of
a contracting state. Further, the treaty with Brazil pro-
vides a 10 percent reduced rate for the interest paid for
loans with a term of more than seven years, whereas
the treaty with Argentina exempts from withholding
tax the interest paid for loans with a term of more
than three years.
2. Royalties
Regarding royalty income, the withholding tax per-
centage may vary among treaties depending on the
type of royalty. For instance, the treaty with Argentina
introduces several percentages of royalty withholding
tax (that is, 3 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent) for
specific types of royalty income, and 15 percent in
other cases. The treaty with Venezuela also introduces
several percentages (5 percent, 7 percent, and 10 per-
cent) and in other cases, the law of the source state
may determine the percentage. The treaty with Brazil
introduces 25 percent (for example, trademark) or 15
percent withholding tax in other cases. Other treaties
introduce a single withholding tax rate for all royalty
income, such as the treaty with Mexico (that is, 10 per-
cent, amended by the 2009 protocol19) and the treaty
with Panama (that is, 5 percent).
E. Capital Gains
The Netherlands has the goal in its treaties of
agreeing on exclusive taxation of capital gains by the
country of residence in situations that are not explicitly
excluded in article 13 of the OECD model. According
to article 13, the source country may only tax capital
gains from the alienation of immovable property situ-
ated in the source state (article 13(1)), gains from the
movable property forming part of the business property
of a PE of an enterprise (article 13(2)), gains from the
alienation of a ship/aircraft (article 13(3)), and gains
from the alienation of shares deriving more than 50
percent of their value directly or indirectly from the
immovable property situated in the source state (article
13(4)). In other cases, the country of residence will
have the exclusive right to tax capital gains (article
13(5)).
The Netherlands follows to a great extent article 13
of the OECD model, but regarding article 13(4) its
goal is to introduce two deviations. The first one is a
higher percentage than 50 percent; more specifically a
percentage between 70 and 90 percent has been intro-
duced in treaties concluded by the Netherlands.20 The
second change is to limit taxation at source state of
capital gains obtained from shares from listed com-
panies, small participations, business immovable assets,
participations held by pension funds, and gains obtained
as a result of reorganizations within a group of enter-
prises.21
For instance, article 13(6) of the treaty with Panama
states that gains from the alienation of shares deriving
more than 90 percent of their value from immovable
property are taxed in the source country. However,
those gains will be taxed in the residence country only
when:
• the resident owned less than 10 percent of the
shares or other comparable interests before the
first alienation;
• the gain is derived in the course of a corporate
reorganization, amalgamation, division, or similar
transaction; or
• the resident is a pension fund that is recognized
and controlled according to the statutory provi-
sions of a contracting state, provided that the gain
is not derived from the carrying on of a business,
directly or indirectly, by that pension fund.
18The prior percentage was 15 percent, and now it is 5 per-
cent for loans from bank institutions and 10 percent in other
cases.
19Before the 2009 protocol, the treaty with Mexico had a
withholding tax rate of 15 percent for royalty income.
202011 TTP (Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid 2011), at n.47.
21Id. at 49.
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No other changes have been implemented in the
treaties concluded by the Netherlands with Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, or Venezuela.
Also, the Netherlands strives for exclusive taxation
in the country of residence of the seller regarding gains
realized on the alienation of shares (other than shares
of article 13(4) in a company, or of securities, bonds,
debentures, and the like). The main reason is that the
Netherlands’ policy is to avoid economic double taxa-
tion on those gains as long as they qualify under the
Dutch participation exemption (deelnemingswinsten).
Nevertheless, in some situations the Netherlands has
agreed to source taxation on the capital gain derived
from the alienation of shares, for instance, if the
source country deems this to be consistent with its
wish to apply a withholding tax on dividends.22 With
Latin American countries, the Netherlands has agreed
on that with Argentina and Mexico.
For instance, with Mexico the provision states that
gains from the alienation of shares on a participation
of more than 25 percent will be subject to taxation by
the source country; however, the tax to be charged is
limited to a rate of 10 percent.23 This article does not
apply if the gains are obtained as a result of reorgani-
zation, merger, splitting, or any other similar opera-
tion.24 The treaty between the Netherlands and Argen-
tina introduces two percentages for a tax at source —
10 percent if there is a substantial (that is, 25 percent)
shareholding participation, or 15 percent in any other
cases (article 14(5) of the treaty with Argentina).
F. Most Favored Nation Treatment Clause
In the 2011 TTP, the Netherlands reaffirms the EU
approach that treaties are the result of negotiations
between two parties and therefore the Netherlands is
unwilling to agree on a most favored nation treatment
clause that can be applied to other (third) parties than
the treaty contracting parties. Further, the Netherlands
argues that the introduction of a most favored nation
treatment clause may result in the countries being re-
duced in their margin (scope) for negotiation.
For countries outside the European Union, the same
argument is being followed, and therefore the Nether-
lands states its reluctance to agree on most favored na-
tion treatment clauses in its treaties. The Netherlands
currently has not introduced those types of clauses in
the treaties concluded with Latin American countries.
G. Treaty Antiabuse Clauses
1. Antiabuse Clauses
The Netherlands Supreme Court has a reserved ap-
proach to domestic antiabuse clauses, such as fraus le-
gis,25 to prevent treaty abuse. As a consequence, the
Netherlands is willing to include antiabuse provisions
in treaty negotiations and is willing to agree on reason-
able antiabuse provisions if there is a real risk of treaty
abuse given the interaction between the relevant tax
systems.26
Further, the Netherlands commits to agree on rea-
sonable antiabuse provisions following treaty negotia-
tions and upon request of the treaty partner.
The first type of treaty antiabuse clause is the ben-
eficial ownership provision that is designed to prevent
abuse by means of treaty shopping. The treaties con-
cluded with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and
Venezuela have introduced the concept of beneficial
ownership for dividends, interest, and royalties.
The second type of treaty antiabuse clause is the
limitation on benefits provision that is directed toward
the activities of the person entitled to the element of
income. This clause is generally found in the treaties
concluded by the Netherlands, for instance in its treaty
with the United States. The third type of treaty anti-
abuse clause is the main purpose test applicable to
transactions carried out with the goal of obtaining a
treaty benefit unintended by the parties when conclud-
ing the treaty. The main purpose test is, for instance,
found in the treaty with Qatar (protocol).27 Those
clauses have not yet been found in the treaties with
Latin American countries.
Finally, with the goal of safeguarding legal certainty,
the Netherlands applies a reserved approach. The ap-
proach is to apply the LOB and the main purpose test
22Id. at 48.
23Ad 6 protocol modifying article 13(4) of the Mexico-
Netherlands treaty.
24See article 13(4) of the Mexico-Netherlands treaty in con-
junction with 2009 protocol Ad. 15.
25The antiavoidance doctrine of fraud of law (fraus legis) has
been introduced by the judiciary in the Netherlands. By means
of this doctrine, the taxpayer can carry out transactions targeting
tax benefits but the taxpayer’s focus should not be only those tax
benefits. This doctrine is used as ultimum remedium that ‘‘can
only be considered after interpretation and characterisation ac-
cording to the normal interpretation methods have been fully
utilized without this leading to an outcome that can be regarded
as consistent with the purpose and intent of the law.’’ R.L. Yzer-
man, ‘‘Report for the Netherlands, Form, and Substance in Tax
Law,’’ Cahiers de droit Fiscal Int’l, International Fiscal Association,
vol. 87a, SDU Uitgevers, the Netherlands, 2002, at 452 and 455.
262011 TTP (Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid 2011) at 48.
27According to the Dutch reporters to the IFA Congress
2010, the purpose of the main substance test is ‘‘that treaty ben-
efits are not granted if the relevant structure is set up with the
sole or predominant reason of gaining the treaty benefits. Most
of those provisions are found in the articles concerning divi-
dends, interest and royalties, but main purpose tests are also used
to counter mala fide emigration of corporations’’ (see Protocol
III to article 4(4) of the Netherlands-Qatar 2008 treaty and
article 34(2) of the tax arrangement for the Kingdom of the
Netherlands). F. Peters and A. Roelofsen, the Netherlands, ‘‘Tax
Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-Avoidance
Provisions,’’ Cahiers de droit Fiscal Int’l, IFA, vol. 95A, IBFD,
2010, at 573.
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not as general clauses but as specific clauses, for in-
stance by specifically mentioning the type of transac-
tion to which each can be applicable.28
2. Antiabuse Clause
In the recent treaty between the Netherlands and
Panama29 a new article has been included (article 27)
that provides for the contracting parties to apply any
domestic law and measure to prevent, discourage,
avoid, or counteract the effect of any transaction, ar-
rangement, or practice that results in improper use of
the treaty. Article 27 also states that ‘‘the contracting
states shall designate by mutual agreement the domes-
tic law and measures concerned.’’30
This clause follows, to some extent, the clause intro-
duced in the tax agreement with Hong Kong.31 The
result could be that the contracting parties, and in this
case the Netherlands, may introduce new domestic
measures to counteract the effect of the improper use
of the treaty, which can also result in treaty override.32
H. Interpretation of Treaty and Arbitration
The Netherlands in general follows a dynamic inter-
pretation of the tax treaty articles following the devel-
opments in the OECD commentary. This may give rise
to problems for the application of treaties with coun-
tries that follow a static approach. In order to solve the
differences between those approaches, the Netherlands
stated in its 2011 TTP to agree during treaty negotia-
tions on the application of the recent or future changes
in the OECD model and OECD commentary and the
application of those changes to the current treaties.
Alternatively, a general clause (kapstok bepaling) can be
agreed on that delegates simple implementation of new
provisions or interpretation methods by mutual agree-
ment between the competent authorities.33
Also, the Netherlands tries to introduce the wording
of article 25(5) of the OECD model in its treaties.34
This article provides for a mutual agreement procedure,
and in case this agreement is not successful within two
years, it provides for (binding) arbitrage upon request
of the taxpayer. The possibility to request arbitrage by
a taxpayer changes the policy of the Netherlands be-
fore the 1990s (in the past a request for arbitrage could
by made only by the competent authorities). Finally, in
case the outcome of an arbitrage procedure deviates
from a prior judgment in the treaty partner’s country,
and its legal system, like the Netherlands’, provides for
such a deviation, then the limitation to only submit
unresolved issues to arbitrage can be removed from the
text of the treaty that will be concluded.35
The treaty with Panama does not include a clause
similar to article 25(5) of the OECD model mentioned
above, but it does state in article 23(5) the following:
282011 TTP (Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid 2011), at 70 and 71.
29Signed October 2010 and in force as of December 1, 2012.
30Article 27 of the Netherlands-Panama treaty states:
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the right of
each Contracting Party to apply any of its domestic laws
and measures for preventing, discouraging, avoiding or
counteracting the effect of any transaction, arrangement,
or practice that has the purpose or effect of improperly
conferring a tax benefit to any person. The Contracting
States shall designate by mutual agreement the domestic
laws and measures concerned.
31Article 27 of the Hong Kong-Netherlands treaty also in-
cludes that clause, although it is a little more extensive than the
one in the treaty with Panama and states that:
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of
each Contracting Party to apply its domestic laws and
measures concerning tax avoidance, whether or not de-
scribed as such.
2. For the purposes of this Article, ‘‘laws and measures
concerning tax avoidance’’ includes laws and measures for
preventing, discouraging, avoiding, or counteracting the
effect of any transaction, arrangement, or practice that has
the purpose or effect of conferring a tax benefit on any
person.
3. For the purposes of this Article, ‘‘laws and measures
concerning tax avoidance’’ includes for the Netherlands in
any case: Article 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph b, in con-
nection with article 17a, paragraph 1, subparagraph c, of
the Corporate Income Tax Act 1969, or any identical or
substantially similar provisions replacing these Articles.
Article 27 of the Hong Kong-Netherlands treaty, signed
March 2010 and in force as of October 24, 2011.
32By means of treaty override, a tax treaty concluded by the
country has equal force as domestic law and thus the most re-
cent prevails. The result is that a conflict between a bilateral tax
convention and a domestic law is solved by applying the provi-
sion introduced later in time. In other words, for a tax issue if
domestic law is later in time, the bilateral tax convention is no
longer applicable.
332011 TTP (Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid 2011), at 24-25.
34Article 25(5) paragraph 5 of the OECD model states:
Where, a) under paragraph 1, a person has presented a
case to the competent authority of a Contracting State on
the basis that the actions of one or both of the Contract-
ing States have resulted for that person in taxation not in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention, and b)
the competent authorities are unable to reach an agree-
ment to resolve that case pursuant to paragraph 2 within
two years from the presentation of the case to the compe-
tent authority of the other Contracting State, any unre-
solved issues arising from the case shall be submitted to
arbitration if the person so requests. These unresolved is-
sues shall not, however, be submitted to arbitration if a
decision on these issues has already been rendered by a
court or administrative tribunal of either State. Unless a
person directly affected by the case does not accept the
mutual agreement that implements the arbitration deci-
sion, that decision shall be binding on both Contracting
States and shall be implemented notwithstanding any time
limits in the domestic laws of these States. The competent
authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual
agreement settle the mode of application of this para-
graph.
352011 TPP (Notitie Fiscaal Vedragsbeleid 2011), at 66.
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the competent authorities may also agree on
other forms of resolution when a mutual agree-
ment can not be reached.
Thus, one may argue that on the basis of this article
23(5), it should be possible to make use of alternative
dispute resolution methods such as binding arbitrage if
the mutual agreement is unsuccessful.36
IV. Summary and Recommendations
The Netherlands no longer makes use of the Dutch
model tax treaty but instead follows the OECD model.
Regarding Latin American countries, the Netherlands
in principle is willing to follow the U.N. model provi-
sions for the minimum period during which specific
activities should be carried out in order to constitute a
PE (that is, a period longer than six months instead of
the regular 12 months). For dividends, interest, and
royalties, the Netherlands in principle follows the
OECD model. Consequently, the Netherlands has a
goal of a 0 percent dividend withholding tax rate for
non-portfolio substantial shareholdings and no tax at
source on interest and royalty payments.
The 2011 TTP contains open concepts that allow for
changes in the relationship of the Netherlands with
other countries when negotiating treaties. For instance,
in the case of the attribution of profits to PEs, the
2011 TTP states that further conditions may be re-
quired by the Netherlands, but it does not address the
content of those possible conditions.
Also, the inclusion of antiabuse provisions in the
treaty in principle is limited to reasonable antiabuse
provisions, which has the goal of providing for legal
certainty. Therefore, the Netherlands is reserved in
agreeing on provisions such as a LOB clause or a main
purpose test in treaties based on the nondefined crite-
rion of reasonable provisions. It does not explain what
is meant by the term ‘‘reasonable,’’ and there are no
examples of situations on which those provisions can
be agreed.
The MOF during the Parliamentary discussions on
the 2011 TTP stated that technical notes regarding the
2011 TTP are unnecessary given that the Parliamentary
documents, the previous tax treaty policy memoran-
dums, and the explanatory note to the treaties should
be sufficient to clarify international tax issues not com-
pletely specified in the 2011 TTP.37
Even with the above, I believe that the policy ad-
opted in the 2011 TTP is theoretical and it leaves too
much room for interpretation of the Netherlands’ ob-
jectives in its tax treaty policy. Taking into account that
the Dutch model treaty is no longer applicable, the
2011 TTP is the only guidance to determine the policy
of the Netherlands regarding other countries for negoti-
ating new treaties. In order to better understand the
Netherlands’ policy for foreign new treaty partners, it is
recommended to provide a full English translation of
the 2011 TTP document as well as an overview of ex-
amples from current, in-force treaties or current inter-
national tax practices in which additional justifications
or ‘‘reasonable’’ antiabuse provisions have been in-
cluded. ◆
36This was also stated in the explanatory memorandum to the
treaty with Panama. Memorie van Toelichting 8 september 2011: 32
907. Verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Republiek
Panama tot het vermijden van dubbele belasting en het voorkomen van het
ontgaan van belasting met betrekking tot belastingen naar het inkomen,
met Protocol; ‘s-Gravenhage, 6 oktober 2010.
37Kamerstukken II 25087, 2010-2011, Annex I, June 24, 2011, at
2.
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